Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; CHAPTER 1 Theoretical framework; CHAPTER 2 Strategic-form analysis: theory; CHAPTER 3 Strategic-form analysis: applications; CHAPTER 4 Refinements of Nash equilibrium: theory; CHAPTER 5 Refinements of Nash equilibrium: applications; CHAPTER 6 Incomplete information: theory; CHAPTER 7 Incomplete information: applications; CHAPTER 8 Repeated interaction: theory; CHAPTER 9 Repeated interaction: applications; CHAPTER 10 Evolution and rationality; CHAPTER 11 Learning to play; CHAPTER 12 Social learning and equilibrium selection. Fernando Vega-Redondo's self-contained account of the main contributions of modern game theory and its applications to economics starts with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations. The discussion proceeds by studying basic solution concepts and their main refinements; games played under incomplete information; and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, the text includes a companion set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic analysis in economics (e.g., oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination failures, bargaining, insurance markets, implementation theory, signaling and auctions)