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  1. Common value auctions and the winner's curse
    Erschienen: c2002
    Verlag:  Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J

    Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a... mehr

    Kühne Logistics University – KLU, Bibliothek
    keine Fernleihe
    Hochschulbibliothek Friedensau
    Online-Ressource
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    EBS Universität für Wirtschaft und Recht, Standort Wiesbaden, Fachbibliothek Rechtswissenschaften
    E-Book
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies s

     

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    Volltext (Connect to MyiLibrary resource)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Beteiligt: Levin, Dan
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9780691016672; 9781282158757
    Schlagworte: Value; Auctions; Paradoxes
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (xvi, 401 p.), ill
    Bemerkung(en):

    Includes bibliographical references and index

    Bidding in common value auctions: a survey of experimental research / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    First-price common value auctions: bidder behavior and the "winner's curse" / John H. Kagel ... [et al.]

    Winner's curse and public information in common value auctions / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad

    Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: a laboratory study / John H. Kagel, Ronald M. Harstad, Dan Levin

    Revenue effects and information processing in English common value auctions / Dan Levin, John H. Kagel, Jean-François Richard

    Common value auctions with insider information / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? / Colin Campbell, Dan Levin

    Second-price auctions with asymmetric payoffs: an experimental investigation / Christopher Avery, John H. Kagel

    Learning in common value auctions: some initial observations / Susan Garvin, John H. Kagel

    Cross-game learning: experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions / John H. Kagel

    Comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: a laboratory analysis / Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel, Dan Levin

    Bidding in common value auctions: how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse / Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel.

    Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web